Still Waiting for Subs

Budnichenko and Krivoruchko at Sevmash

Krivoruchko and Budnichenko at Sevmash

The press-conference photo shows Deputy Defense Minister and arms tsar Aleksey Krivoruchko with Sevmash general director Mikhail Budnichenko. Heavily scaffolded CGN Admiral Nakhimov provides the backdrop. The Sevmash boss looks like he needs some antacids.

Krivoruchko told the assembled Russian media:

“The quantity of nuclear submarines being transferred to the fleet will be increased, the decision on this has been made. We expect to receive 10 nuclear submarines of projects 955A and 885M by 2024.”

If we’re generous, we could say the Russian Navy got (or will get) five new SSBNs and two new SSNs — a grand total of seven — in the first two decades of the 21st century.

Now Krivoruchko says Sevmash will finish and deliver ten in the next five years.

Let’s look closer.

The initial 955A — Knyaz Vladimir — is in trials and could be accepted in December 2019.

Krivoruchko also told the media Knyaz Oleg, Yasen-M SSNs Kazan and Novosibirsk, and former project 949A Oscar II SSGN Belgorod — now project 09852 and reported Poseydon “doomsday torpedo” carrier — will be received in 2020.

He also noted that contracts for two more Borey-A (making ten Borey boats overall including seven Borey-A units) and two more Yasen-M (nine Yasen overall including eight Yasen-M) have been signed.

If Kazan arrives in 2020, Novosibirsk seems more likely in 2021. Knyaz Oleg might reach the fleet in 2021.

Krasnoyarsk possibly in 2022, and Arkhangelsk in 2023. Generalissimus Suvorov could be delivered in 2023 or 2024. Perm perhaps in 2024.

The first of the last two Borey-A SSBNs currently on the books — Imperator Aleksandr III — might make the 2024 deadline. But almost certainly not the other — Knyaz Pozharskiy.

So ten new nuclear submarines in Russia’s order-of-battle by the end of 2024 is certainly conceivable, but is it likely? Here are some difficulties:

  • Russia is still taking an inordinate amount of time to build boats. Nine, ten, even 11 years. It hasn’t delivered a new nuclear submarine in five years. Saying it can cut the time to seven or eight years could be specious.
  • 2020 is the big year. If Russian builders don’t deliver the five submarines Krivoruchko promised in 2020, his plan for 2024 becomes impossible. All other boats will be pushed back accordingly.
  • The backlog in the hall at Sevmash will be hard to unwind. Instead of cutting to 7-8 years, build time could stay at 9-10-11 years.
  • Five years is a long time. Political, economic, technological, and military changes could impact Krivoruchko’s schedule decisively.

Perhaps Krivoruchko’s message is just the MOD’s latest effort to hurry Sevmash along.

The extra two 955A SSBNs Krivoruchko mentioned, if built, would give Moscow a force of ten modern boats to split evenly between its Northern and Pacific Fleets.

Submarine Class Delivery Laydown to Delivery (Years)
Yuriy Dolgorukiy Borey 2013 16
Aleksandr Nevskiy Borey 2013 10
Vladimir Monomakh Borey 2014 9
Severodvinsk Yasen 2014 20
Knyaz Vladimir Borey-A 2019-2020 (?) 7-8 (?)
Kazan Yasen-M 2020 (?) 11 (?)
Belgorod ex-Oscar II 2020 (?) 28 (?)
Novosibirsk Yasen-M 2021 (?) 8 (?)
Knyaz Oleg Borey-A 2021 (?) 7 (?)
Krasnoyarsk Yasen-M 2022 (?) 8 (?)
Arkhangelsk Yasen-M 2023 (?) 8 (?)
Generalissimus Suvorov Borey-A 2023-2024 (?) 8-9 (?)
Perm Yasen-M 2024 (?) 8 (?)
Imperator Aleksandr III Borey-A 2024-2025 (?) 8-9 (?)
Knyaz Pozharskiy Borey-A 2025-2026 (?) 8-9 (?)
??? Yasen-M
??? Yasen-M
??? Borey-A
??? Borey-A
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Keep the Outhouse

Many things kept me from the keyboard in recent months. I’m trying to reboot.

Topwar.ru ran an interesting item on September 5. The RF Education Ministry is considering ending the training of lathe operators, fitters, and machinists in Russia’s post-secondary vocational and technical colleges.

The ministry proposes to stop accepting students for these “obsolete” skills starting in 2021. It will end courses for nine professions and 23 specialties in all.

The old skills don’t correspond to the demands of today’s labor market, according to the ministry. They will be replaced by training for the top 50 future professions and specialties as determined by the Ministries of Labor and Education.

If the Education Ministry has identified the new jobs, Topwar didn’t relay them.

Reader comments were interesting. Some readers pointed to artificial intelligence, computer programming, and even the Fedor robot working aboard the ISS. Others focused on economics. Many young people don’t want to work for 30,000 rubles ($450) a month out in the hinterland (closer to Moscow machinists make more).

It’s likely the RF Ministry of Education has the picture below in mind.

It shows a Swiss CNC vertical milling machine in some Russian business. Perhaps this is what the ministry wants future workers to learn.

But many Russian industries and crucial defense enterprises don’t look like this. And the Russian OPK advertises every day to fill openings for qualified machinists.

Maybe enterprises will get these workers from other sources. Maybe the Education Ministry’s proposal won’t even take effect.

Or maybe the OPK hasn’t focused what the ministry is suggesting. It could have a negative impact on Russian defense production.

As our dedy are fond of saying:

Не срывай сортир до того как унитаз хорошо работает!

Promotion List

The promotion list contains names of 552 generals and admirals against 730 the MOD says it has.

This link goes to a larger file with more data.

The newest promotees were announced on June 11, 2019.

Russia Day Promotions

RF President Vladimir Putin signed out his Russia Day promotion list on June 11. The MOD got 11 two-star and 14 one-star promotions. Putin’s alternative army — the National Guard — did almost as well receiving one three-star, five two-star, and 11 one-star promotions. Find the list here.

Newly minted Vice-Admiral Rekish

Newly minted Vice-Admiral Rekish

Putin’s list this time was interesting because four generals were picked up for two-star after waiting seven or eight years for it. They include:

  • Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander, Aerospace Forces (VKS);
  • Commander, 33rd Missile Army, RVSN;
  • Commander, 20th CAA;
  • Commander, 36th CAA.

Putin, and Defense Minister Shoygu perhaps, really seem to like the NTsUO and the GSA’s Military Strategy Faculty at this time for some reason.

Other two-stars include the Chief of MOD’s GU MVS, a deputy chief of NTsUO (who picks up his second star in four years), the Chief of the Military Strategy Faculty at GSA, the chief of comms and deputy chief of staff for comms in the Eastern MD (strange choice for general-lieutenant), and the Chief of Staff, First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet (VADM Rekish).

New one-stars commanding significant formations include:

  • 90th Tank Division, Central MD;
  • 76th Air-Assault Division, VDV;
  • Commander, 2nd MRD, Western MD;
  • Commander, 31st Submarine Division (SSBNs), Northern Fleet.

Staff officers getting their first stars include the chief of missile troops and artillery and chief of armor service (Central MD); a professor, Military Strategy Faculty (GSA); chief of personnel directorate (VKS); chief of NTsUO’s flight coordination center and chief of NTsUO’s territorial affiliate in the Black Sea Fleet.

Six promotees couldn’t be identified in a post. Two are new two-stars. We have to assume they only reach general-lieutenant without public mention if they serve in the GRU, SSO, et al.

Short and long promotion list files will be available in the next day or two.

Military Academy Instructor Arrested in Bombing

Kommersant recently covered what’s happened on this case. Recall on April 2 St. Petersburg’s Military-Space Academy (VKA) named for Mozhayskiy was the scene of an apparent terrorist bombing. But the prime suspect is an instructor, Colonel Rifat Zakirov —  combat engineer and decorated EOD expert with two tours in the Chechen wars to his credit. Other sources say he’s a lieutenant colonel. He’s under house arrest.

Rifat Zakirov

Rifat Zakirov

Zakirov was injured in the blast and couldn’t be questioned for nearly a month. Military investigators say he had TNT and bomb components taken as war trophies, and he’s been charged with theft of explosives as well as illegally possessing and transporting them. But they say he didn’t intend to blow up VKA. No, he just wanted to privatize another military apartment.

Yes, Zakirov hoped his desperate action would resolve his unsatisfactory housing situation.

To back things up a bit, Zakirov once had a 58-square-meter two-room apartment in Sertolovo outside St. Petersburg. It was a service apartment (belonging to the MOD) he received in 2004 and immediately privatized. This satisfied the MOD’s obligation to provide the career officer with permanent housing. The widowed Zakirov lived there with his two sons.

But things got complicated. Relatives came to live with him. He remarried. In 2016, he asked the MOD to improve his circumstances, now outside the norm for inhabitants per square meter. The military duly assigned him a new service apartment in St. Petersburg but said he couldn’t privatize it because he couldn’t return the “permanent” one in Sertolovo where left his relatives.

So Zakirov hatched the plot to plant an explosive device, discover, and disarm it. As a hero, the MOD wouldn’t deny another request to privatize his second, larger apartment.

When Zakirov and colleagues entered the VKA building on April 2, he “noticed” a suspicious package with a mobile phone with wires inside. He sounded the alarm and evacuated cadets and staff. Wearing a protective vest and helmet, he was about to cover the bomb with a vest when it detonated. The bomb contained no shrapnel and, other than Zakirov, no one was seriously hurt by the explosion.

If someone other than the GVSU claimed all this, you’d say he was crazy.

New Tank Regiment?

RG gave us the scantest info. The Russian Army is upgrading an independent tank battalion to a regiment in Smolensk oblast, in the Western MD. The new regiment will belong to one of the 20th CAA’s motorized rifle divisions.

It reportedly will be outfitted with T-72BA tanks, BMP-2 AIFVs, engineer and repair-recovery vehicles, air defense, and recce.

According to RG, the 20th CAA is the largest “large formation” [объединение — anything above a division] in Russia’s armed forces. It is deployed along Russia’s western border in Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, and Smolensk oblasts.

Then one has to scrounge. There’s info of varying quality and completeness available. Sometimes you find something like this or this.

The new tank regiment will be part of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, based in Smolensk and Bryansk oblasts. The 144th at present may look like this:

  • Headquarters (Yelnya, Smolensk obl.)
  • 448th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Klintsy, Bryansk obl.)
  • 182nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Zaymishche, Bryansk obl.)
  • 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Klintsy)
  • 228th Tank Regiment (Klintsy)
  • 856th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (Pochep, Bryansk obl.)
  • 1259th SAM Regiment (???)
  • 673rd SAM Battalion (???)
  • 148th Reconnaissance Battalion (Smolensk)
  • 1281st Anti-Tank Battalion (Yelnya)
  • 295th Engineer Battalion (Yelnya)
  • 686th Signals Battalion (Smolensk)
  • 1032nd Material Support Battalion (Pochep)
  • 150th Medical Battalion (Pochep)
  • UAV Company (???)
  • EW Company (???)
  • Radiological, Chemical, Biological Defense Company (???)

In the first link above, Yuriy Barash, a Ukrainian observer, maintains in 2017 the 144th began forming up its 182nd MRR, 228th TR, and 1259th SAM Regiment as well as anti-tank, material support, and medical battalions. It had not started forming up the 254th MRR or the specialist companies, according to him.

T-72

So does the 228th Tank Regiment already exist? No and yes.

If Barash’s TO&E for the 144th isn’t wrong (but it could be), the 448th MRR and 856th SP Artillery Regiment appear to be its only fleshed out and combat-capable units. In 2017, he held only 40 T-72s in the division (the tank battalion of the 448th).

CAST, however, suggested that the 144th has an independent tank battalion that will be upgraded to a regiment, to become the 228th TR.

There are also discrepancies regarding the locations of different units.

Welcome to following Russia’s OOB.

Here’s the moral. Saying you have a division on your western border is one thing;  actually having one is something else. 

Expected in 2019

On June 4, Sergey Shoygu told the Russian Defense Ministry collegium the armed forces will receive 400 new or modernized armored vehicles before the end of this year. T-90M, T-72B3M, and T-80BVM tanks and BMP-1AM infantry fighting vehicles are among the systems to be delivered.

T-90M

T-90M

Interfaks-AVN reported that the T-90M was developed through the Proryv-3 [Breakthrough-3] R&D program — a deep modernization of the T-90 fielded in the mid-1990s. The T-90M has a new turret, 125-mm main gun, remote-controlled 12.7-mm machine gun, and digital fire control.

The Pacific Fleet’s Troops and Forces in the North-East are supposed to get more updated MiG-31BM interceptors, T-80BVM tanks, and BMP-2M IFVs, according to Interfaks-AVN.