Tag Archives: Gosoboronzakaz

What They Got

reloading-iskander-m-photo-tass-yuriy-smityuk

Reloading Iskander-M (photo: TASS / Yuriy Smityuk)

Time to review what the Russian Armed Forces say they got during the last year. One can’t confirm what weapons and equipment were delivered, so Russian claims have to suffice.

This information appeared in Sergey Shoygu’s speech to the MOD Collegium on December 22 found here.  TASS recapped the speech later that day. And Krasnaya zvezda dutifully recounted some of it on December 27.

Overall, Defense Minister Shoygu reported that state defense order (GOZ) deliveries increased five percent over 2015.

Beyond what the Russian military procured, Shoygu had interesting remarks on other issues.  They are grouped more coherently below than in the original, to preserve the reader’s patience.

Modernization, Serviceability, and Manning

Shoygu announced that Russia’s “combat possibilities” increased 14 percent in 2016. From what to what, he didn’t say.  “Combat possibilities” is a Russian measure of how forces are equipped, divided by other key factors like manning, readiness, training, and morale.

Service modernization percentages are:

  • Navy up to 47 percent.
  • Aerospace Forces (VKS) up to 66 percent.
  • Ground Troops — 42 percent.
  • Airborne Troops — 47 percent.
  • RVSN — 51 percent.

(N.B.  Percentages reported at the end of 2015 were 39, 52, 35, 41, and 51 respectively.)

Arms and equipment in “permanent readiness” units are 58 percent modern, according to the defense minister.  The in-service rate of equipment in these units is 94 percent (up 5 percent from 2015).

Serviceability of VKS aircraft is 62 percent.

According to Shoygu, the armed forces are manned at 93 percent of their authorized strength, and 384,000 contractees are in the ranks.  The NCO ranks are fully professional for the first time.  Apparently, the military no longer relies on conscripts hastily turned into sergeants.

Force Structure Changes

New equipment allowed for force structure expansion in the Ground and Airborne Troops. According to TASS, Shoygu reported that nine new formations, including four motorized rifle and one tank division, appeared in the former.  In the latter, three reconnaissance battalions, six tank companies, and EW and UAV companies were established.

Navy

In 2016, the Russian Navy received 24 ships and support vessels, and the Proyekt 636.3 diesel-electric submarines Velikiy Novgorod and Kolpino for the Black Sea Fleet.  The surface vessels included a Proyekt 22870 rescue ship, a Proyekt 19920 hydrographic ship, Proyekt 11356 frigates Admiral Grigorovich and Admiral Essen, and Proyekt 12700 mine countermeasures ship Aleksandr Obukhov.

The Navy acquired 100 Kalibr (SS-N-27 / Sizzler) and Oniks (SS-N-26 / Strobile) cruise missiles.  These missiles are carried on new Proyekt 636.3 subs and Proyekt 11356 frigates.

In early December, logistics chief Army General Dmitriy Bulgakov said 19 of the 24 ships delivered were auxiliaries.  And Admiral Essen fouled its screws while mooring before departing for its Black Sea homeport.  The third Proyekt 11356 Admiral Makarov did not reach the fleet, nor did the first Proyekt 22350 Admiral Gorshkov frigate, or the initial Proyekt 11711 LSD Ivan Gren. Another less than impressive year of naval construction.

Aerospace Forces

The air forces received:

  • 139 aircraft, including Su-35S fighters and ten Yak-130 trainers.  Eight Su-30SM fighters went to Crimea, two to Rostov-na-Donu, and others to the Northern and Baltic Fleet.
  • Unspecified numbers of new Mi-28N, Ka-52, Mi-35M, Mi-26, Mi-8AMTSh-VA, and Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters.
  • Four regimental sets of S-400 SAMs, 25 Pantsir-S gun-missile systems, and 74 radars.
  • Two modernized Tu-160M and two modernized Tu-95MS strategic bombers.

Ground Troops

The Ground Troops reportedly received 2,930 new or modernized systems allowing for two missile brigades, two SAM brigades and two SAM regiments, one Spetsnaz brigade, 12 motorized rifle and tank battalions, and three artillery battalions to be reequipped.

Besides two brigade sets of Iskander-M, they obtained 60 Tornado-G MRLs, 70 modernized Grad-M MRLs, and 20 Msta-SM SP howitzers.  They acquired 22,000 communications systems bringing that equipment to 49 percent modern. More than 100 BTR-82AM joined Western MD forces.  They also received ten new EW systems.

eleron-3sv-uav-package-for-ground-troops

Eleron-3SV UAV package for Ground Troops

The armed forces procured 105 systems with 260 UAVs.  These included more than ten new Orlan-10 and Eleron-3 UAVs.  They formed 36 units and subunits. The Russian military now operates 600 systems with 2,000 UAVs, compared with only 180 old systems in 2011.

Airborne Troops

The Russian airborne got 188 new or modernized vehicles, including 60 BMD-4M and BTR-MDM, 35 BTR-82A, 40 modernized BREM-D, 2S9-1M SP mortars, and more than 6,000 D-10 and Arbalet-2 parachutes.

At his final MOD teleconference of the year, the defense minister said 764 armored vehicles and 88 artillery systems of all types were acquired in 2016.

rs-24-yars-icbm

RS-24 Yars ICBM

RVSN

Russia’s strategic missile troops placed four RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2 or SS-29?) ICBM regiments on combat duty in 2016, according to Shoygu.  RVSN Commander General-Colonel Karakayev earlier said 23 Yars mobile and silo-based missiles were put into service.

The defense minister said the armed forces got a total of 41 new (intercontinental-range) ballistic missiles (presumably both land- and sea-launched), bringing Russia’s strategic nuclear triad to 60 percent modern.

The balance — 18 missiles — could be Bulava SLBMs.  They might be for Borey-class SSBN hull four Knyaz Vladimir, along with a couple spares for practice launches.

 Syria

Regarding use of the Syrian war as a proving ground, Shoygu said:

“162 types of modern and modernized arms were tested in the course of combat operations in Syria and showed high effectiveness.  They include the newest Su-30SM and Su-34 aircraft, and Mi-28N and Ka-52 helicopters.  Precision munitions and sea-based cruise missiles employed in combat conditions for the first time confirmed their tactical characteristics.”

Deficiencies were revealed which did not appear in the course of range testing.  The purchase of 10 types of arms has been stopped until [deficiencies] are eliminated.  As a result, we have significantly increased the quality of equipment that guarantees the reliability of its employment in battle.”

P.S.  TASS added that, in 2016, the Southern MD got 350 pieces of armor, other vehicles, missiles, artillery, communications, EW, engineering, and special equipment items. Crimea in particular was reinforced with the S-400, Pantsir-S, Su-30SM, and Bastion (SSC-5 / Stooge) coastal missile launchers, which fire Oniks (SS-N-26 / Strobile) cruise missiles.

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Today We Are Stronger

shoygu-and-putin-at-the-mod-collegium-photo-kremlin-ru

Shoygu and Putin at MOD Collegium (photo: Kremlin.ru)

The year-end MOD Collegium fell on December 22.  International news agencies headlined what sounded like bellicose braggadocio from President Vladimir Putin.  “We are stronger now than any potential aggressor,” he said according to AP.

But his remarks were more nuanced than it’s possible to tell from that wire service quote.

His full speech to the assembled Russian brass is available here.

Putin featured Syria prominently, and indicated that Russia will take advantage of the greater demand for its weapons and equipment because of the war.

He listed force development priorities including “precision weapons, modern communications, reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic warfare systems” and strategic non-nuclear forces.

He noted that the SAP will be completed “by 2021,” effectively giving the military and industry all of 2020 (not just until the end of 2019) to reach its 70 percent modernization goal.  But he also mentioned “five years” to complete rearmament which sounds like 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and all of 2021.  The dates on the arms program are increasingly elastic as necessary.

Not surprisingly, Putin described a higher level of threat on Russia’s borders this year.

A complete translation of Putin’s speech follows.

“Respected comrades!”

“Today at the annual Ministry of Defense Collegium we will discuss results of work during the latest period, and determine near- and long-term tasks for the development of Russia’s Armed Forces and strengthening the country’s defense capability.”

“In 2016, the course of modernizing the army and fleet continued, rhythmically, and their reequipping went according to schedule.”

“The condition of the nuclear triad, which plays the key role in preserving strategic parity, was supported at the necessary level.  I note that the share of modern armaments in the nuclear forces is almost 60 percent.”

“The level of combat training of troops rose substantially.  The results of strategic command-staff exercise Kavkaz-2016 convincingly demonstrated this.  Its successful conduct increased the security of Russia’s southern borders, including from terrorist threats, and helped work out the organization of territorial defense in the Southern and North-Caucasus Federal Districts, including questions of supporting troops, for example their financing in wartime, that require coordination from many state organs and elements, including branches of Russia’s Central Bank.”

“I note also that four surprise combat readiness evaluations of troops took place in the course of the year.  They confirmed that units and sub-units could effectively deploy at great distances and in short periods of time to establish groupings in strategic directions. The Defense Ministry needs to analyze the results of the evaluations in detail and consider them in combat training plans for the future, and also in the organization of other measures of a similar type.”

“The potential of the Russian Armed Forces passed a stress test also in combat with international terrorists in the Syrian Republic.  The Syrian Army received tangible support, thanks to which it conducted several successful operations against militants.”

“I also note the great assistance which our Armed Forces renders to peaceful Syrian citizens.  Almost 800 tons of foodstuffs and medicine alone have already been transferred. I want to thank the leadership and personnel of the Armed Forces participating in the operation once more for their professionalism and courage.”

“Respected comrades!”

“In the coming year, the Ministry of Defense needs to concentrate on resolving the following key tasks.”

“First, to support the balanced development of all services and branches of troops, and to continue the assimilation of precision weapons, modern communications, reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic warfare systems.”

“It is necessary to strengthen the combat potential of strategic nuclear forces, primarily missile systems capable of assuredly overcoming existing and future missile defense systems.”

“Strategic non-nuclear forces also need to be brought to a qualitatively new level, allowing them to neutralize any military threats to Russia.”

“Second.  It is important to maintain the tempo achieved in rearming the army and navy.  To control the realization of measures in the State Armaments Program and fulfillment of the state defense order effectively.”

“By 2021 we need to achieve the established indicators of troop equipping with modern weapons and equipment at not less than 70 percent.”

“We need to make note that five years is not such a long period of time for such a large-scale rearmament program.  Any delay in fulfilling its tasks can cause a break in the production chain, which is then highly difficult to reestablish. Therefore sanctions for breaking contracts should be severe to the maximum extent. Meanwhile, it is important to effectively expose causes of violations and expeditiously eliminate them.”

“I note that essential measures to resolve problematic issues in the fulfillment of the state defense order have been taken at all levels.  On the whole, we need to keep the situation with the realization of the State Armaments Program and with the state of affairs in the defense-industrial complex under constant control.  You know we discuss these issues twice a year at regular meetings in Sochi.  This has already become a tradition which has been highly useful in practical work.  This year two cycles of such meetings occurred.  They allowed us to determine joint steps in the sphere of rearmament, and to support constant working contact between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and industry.”

“Third.  We must closely follow any changes in the balance of forces and military-political situation in the world, especially along Russia’s borders, and simultaneously introduce corrections into plans for neutralizing potential threats to our country.”

“I ask you also to synchronize these plans with updated future planning documents.  Just a few weeks ago the new Information Security Doctrine of Russia was approved, and a little earlier the Scientific-Technical Development Strategy.  The milestones given in them concern all organs of authority, including also militarized departments.”

“Fourth.  The introduction of the newest training means and programs should be among the priorities of operational and combat training.”

“And last.  The effectiveness of employing Russian weapons in Syria opens new possibilities for the development of military-technical cooperation.  We need to use them to the maximum extent.  We know what kind of interest foreign partners are showing in modern Russian armaments.”

“Respected collegium participants!”

“One of the most important directions of military organizational development is increasing social support of servicemen.  You know how much has been done in this relation in recent times.  For example, since January 2012 the line for housing in the Defense Ministry system has been reduced 2.8-fold.  In 2016, 27 thousand servicemen were provided service housing,  and almost 20 thousand permanent housing.  Within the mortgage-savings system, 14 thousand servicemen obtained apartments.”

“It is necessary also to remember:  concern about personnel, and strengthening the social guarantees of soldiers and officers is important, the most important investment in the indoctrination of the young generation of defenders of the Motherland, and guarantee of the prestige of military service and the authority of people in uniform.”

“Respected comrades!”

“On the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, and on commanders at all levels, lies the special responsibility for the qualitative modernization of the Armed Forces.  I believe that in the future you will do everything necessary to achieve high results in combat training.”

“I want to thank the leadership and personnel of the Armed Forces for the precise fulfillment of established tasks, and for their conscientious service.”

“Allow me to wish you further successes.”

After Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu’s lengthy remarks, Putin concluded the session.

“Respected Sergey Kuzhugetovich, respected comrades!”

“In recent years, much has been done to increase the country’s defense capability. But, it stands to reason, much is still not enough.  The minister just spoke about this when he formulated tasks for 2017 and coming years.”

“We need to do much along the lines of strengthening the nuclear triad, perfecting the BMEWS system, in the Aerospace Troops [sic], still more at sea, and in the Ground Troops. We need to perfect reconnaissance and communications systems.  We still have much to do.”

“However today, given a very large number of factors, including not only military ones, but also our history, geography, and the internal condition of Russian society, it is possible with certainty to say:  today we are stronger than any potential aggressor.  Any.”

“At the same time, I would like to turn your attention to the fact that, if we were to allow ourselves for one minute to relax, to allow even one substantive failure in the modernization of the army and navy, or in troop training, the situation could change very quickly given the speed of events transpiring in the world.  We may not even notice.  Therefore, a very great deal depends on the continuation of our work, which began and has been conducted in the course of recent years.”

“I count greatly on you working in a coordinated manner, and being responsible for work assigned to you.  And, working in such a way, we, certainly, will fulfill all tasks which stand before us in the most important sphere of strengthening Russia’s defense capability.”

“I want to thank you again for your service in the past year and wish you success in the coming one.”

“All the best to you.”

“Thank you.”

So Putin wasn’t exactly bragging that Moscow is the biggest bully in the world, but rather claiming that, given Russia’s history and geography as well as its recent military modernization, the Kremlin can now be sure of repulsing any attack on its territory.  Assertions about evil U.S. and NATO intentions notwithstanding, what aggressor has designs on Russia today?  

Putin’s contention is a little abstract, lacking as it does any particular scenario or temporal context.  But it isn’t really as sinister as it sounded in Western media.

More to the point than Putin, however, is Maxim Trudolyubov’s conclusion from his recent op-ed:

“. . . Russia — with its renationalized economy and aging population — is now incapable of competing on equal economic and political terms with other major powers may have led the Kremlin to believe that it can compete only by other means — namely by displaying no hesitation at using force or covert influence to claim Russian greatness again.”

What’s Been Bought (A Preview)

Soon Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu will convene a year-end MOD Collegium to summarize the results of 2016, including procurement.

A preview of Shoygu’s claims about Russian military acquisition in 2016 is evident in year-end reports from individual military districts.

In late November, according to RIA Novosti, the Western MD announced that more than 1,500 pieces of equipment entered its inventory in 2016.  They include Su-35S fighters, Mi-28N, Mi-35M, and Mi-8AMTSh helicopters, BMP-3 and BTR-82A armored vehicles, and Tigr-M and Tayfun vehicles.

In early December, the district’s press-service said its forces will receive 500 major equipment items before the end of the month, including 20 T-72B3 tanks, An-148 transports, Mi-35M and Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters, and 30 command-staff vehicles.

Russian defense industry retains the Soviet tradition of “storming,” or last-minute rush work to meet the annual production plan.  You might not want a ride on a Russian helo assembled in December. 

new-r-149aksh-1-command-staff-vehicle

New R-149AKSh-1 Command-Staff Vehicle

On December 1, the Eastern MD reported it has received more than 650 major pieces of equipment this year.  Interfaks-AVN indicated they include Su-35S and Su-34 aircraft, Iskander-M and Bastion SSMs, Tor, Pantsir-S, and Verba air defense systems, Tornado-G MRLs, and UAVs.

The Central MD got more than 700 equipment items in 2016, according to TASS. It received the Iskander-M, Pantsir-S, eight aircraft, three updated Mi-24 helicopters, and 50 T-72B3 tanks.

The Russian media hasn’t reported on Southern MD acquisition, but, being a high priority, it will likely equal the Western MD’s 2,000 items of equipment.

Logistics tsar Deputy Defense Minister Dmitriy Bulgakov told Izvestiya the military has put more than 6,000 pieces of armor and other vehicles, and 1,000 missile and artillery systems into service this year.  The latter includes “13 brigade and battalion sets” of SSMs and SAMs.  He also noted that 19 auxiliary vessels have been commissioned into the navy.

Bulgakov concluded, with this year’s deliveries, it’s “possible to say that half our armament is new.”  That’s 50 percent on the way to the goal of 70 percent by 2020.

The lists provided by the Russian media weren’t meant to be exhaustive.  We’ll see a more complete enumeration of 2016 procurement from Shoygu or his deputies in the days to come.

But even if we only consider Bulgakov’s 7,000 pieces of equipment, 2016 will be a bigger procurement year than 2014 when President Putin stated that 4,500 weapon systems and other items were acquired.

Dizzy with Success

On Topwar.ru on 15 September, Aleksandr Staver and Roman Skomorokhov asked whether President Vladimir Putin, like his predecessor Stalin, has decided to curb (at least temporarily) his key program.  Today it’s rearmament rather than collectivization.

The authors assess the program and its problems from a conservative viewpoint.

They assert the arms program is not being fulfilled and the MOD budget is being cut (whether admitted or not).  In particular, they contend, it is new weapons programs that are suffering, so they argue for cheaper modernization of existing armaments.

Debate over rearmament is a constant.  Staver and Skomorokhov don’t even mention that the start of the next arms program was delayed, or that the MOD and Finance Ministry are far apart on funding it.

For his part, Putin routinely says the current GPV will not be cut, and the armed forces will have 70 percent modern arms and equipment in 2020.

But 70 percent, according to the authors of this op-ed, is not enough.  More is needed.

Then they turn to corruption.  They allege that the ones who are “dizzy with the success” of the arms program are the ones who are stealing from it.  They say a return to 1937 would put an end to this, and to other problems with rearmament.

Recall that even Putin and United Russia once talked about bringing treason charges for non-fulfillment of the GOZ, but nothing came of it.

So much for preamble.

“Dizzy with Success, or ‘Alarm’ in the Russian Army”

“We are so used to the fact that our army is powerful that we almost don’t notice, or more precisely, don’t wish to notice that light ‘clouds’ threatening to turn into bad storms have appeared over Russia’s VS [Armed Forces].  We talk and write with satisfaction about our aircraft which, at a minimum, don’t lag behind Western ones. We ‘procrastinate’ with Armata and its offshoots, comparing it to the best models of Western armies.  We discuss the advantages of our new missiles and systems.”

“And now, today exactly, heard here and there are announcements by various government bureaucrats and army chiefs about delaying arms procurement to another time, so to speak.  About delayed launches of ships.  About adjusting the schedule for delivering something to the troops.”

“So what’s with this.  Why is this happening?  Recently all officials, including the president and the prime minister, together talked about fulfilling the defense order almost as a matter of honor for Russia. Don’t many remember Putin’s April statement about the unconditional fulfillment of the state defense order?  And can’t many say exactly how much it is fulfilled and whether it is fulfilled?”

“The entire thing is that the necessary money is not in the budget!  The crisis, which we are ‘successfully overcoming,’ still has us in its claws.  We’ve talked a lot about the fact that sanctions hurt Europe and the USA, and how they [sanctions] are going to benefit us.  We are developing, increasing output, winning markets…  On any analytical program on our TV it’s possible to hear a full assortment of such pronouncements.”

“The support of the president and the real successes of our servicemen in Syria inspire hope in us that all this will come true.  The government will find money both for us and for the army.  Industry will begin to work not only well, but both quickly and cheaply.  New ideas of [arms] designers will be realized in the shortest time.”

“Prime Minister Medvedev’s decision, signed on 5 September, to adjust the GOZ for 2016 was only the first call.  It is understood that today there’s no clear data on this question.  Naturally, it’s possible to suppose that defense sector enterprises won’t receive some part of the promised resources.  And this, in its turn, means that GOZ plans for next year will be ruined.  A snowball of corrections will accumulate gradually from the details.”

“And not hiding the fact, by the way, does him credit, Putin himself already talks about the fact that by 2018 our army will be rearmed at 70%, and the state order will be reduced.  And he talks about what is needed to take the place of the defense order, but not pots and pans.”

“From the one side, one who is forewarned is forearmed.  But from the other?  It’s hard to guess with what enterprises will be occupied, with a miracle which drags them out of the debt hole.  And where will workers who turn out to be redundant go at this moment?  But we have already passed through such a scenario.”

“However, certain specifics have already ‘hatched.’ The Ministry of Defense plans to make the famous “Armata” the main battle tank by 2020.  With this aim, the purchase of more than 2,000 of such vehicles for military units has been proposed. According to the tank producer’s data, the order was already for 2,300 tanks.  But not long ago on the Ministry of Defense website an altogether different figure appeared: there is a plan to buy up to 70 “Armatas” in 2017-2019.”

“Naturally, the reasons for changing the [state defense] order aren’t named.  I think over some time versions about some shortcomings, about the modernization of what we already have, [and] some others.  Actually, the reason is banal.  They are cutting the military budget and will cut it.  It’s completely logical, you can’t take money from the shelf if there’s nothing on it.  So folks say.”

“The navy’s situation looks even more confused.  Even the blind see the necessity for modernizing the Russian fleet.  Ships, just like people, age, lose their striking power, and turn into respected veterans.  But we need warriors.  And these ‘warriors’ need to be built.  A lot of them.  The Soviet legacy can no longer guarantee a worthy answer to an aggressor.”

“It seems as though construction began from 2007.  Missile boats, small ships and even submarines began to leave the docks for testing.  New submarines, frigates were laid down at the wharves.  The rebirth had begun.”

“Our excessive belief in the ‘love and friendship of fraternal peoples’ became the first ‘obstacle.’  When construction was stopped by the Ukrainian side [sic].  They stopped supplying Ukrainian engines to us.  Actually, the question of ‘their’ components in combat equipment and armaments arose already in the last century.  And they successfully solved it in the USSR.  But in Russia they put it off ‘for later.'”

“Then the ‘rockslide’ of announcements by military and government bureaucrats on cutbacks in the needs of the fleet began.  I remind the readers about the project 11711 BDK [i.e. an LST].  A large assault ship which was needed to replace Soviet BDKs.  In 2004, a requirement for 6 of such ships for the navy was announced.  Then they decided to review the project.”

“Today we see two ships.  Two instead of six.  It’s been decided to shut down the project.  ‘Ivan Gren’ and ‘Petr Morgunov’ — that’s all that the fleet will receive after testing.”

“It’s possible to talk endlessly about the submarine fleet.  About new missile submarines.  But even they, alas, for the most part remain only projects.  The construction of boats of such a class is a very expensive undertaking.  And this means still unmanageable.”

“Even the Rocket Troops of Strategic Designation [RVSN] will not receive everything promised.  Although, for all times the priority was always right on these troops.  No, ‘Yars’ and similar systems will be supplied.  But land-based ‘Sarmat’ systems most probably won’t be deployed to the original plan.”

“I recall it was planned to replace by 2020 the already aged ‘Voyevod’ missiles (known to most by the NATO ‘nickname’ ‘Satan’) which have served out their time.  Today it’s understood that these plans aren’t being fulfilled.  Today already.  In the best case, such a replacement will occur in 2021.  Or a little later.”

“So where’s the way out of the situation which has been created?  Is there one generally?  I believe there is.  And today the way out is to use those developments which exist and have already been tested in combat.”

“When the VDV [Airborne Troops] commander announced the establishment of tank and BMP companies in units subordinate to him, what kind of vehicles did he mention?  He talked about T-72B3 tanks and BMP-2s.  I hope no one will chide General Shamanov for stupidity and a lack of desire to have the most powerful and modern weaponry?  So why exactly these vehicles?”

“Simply because both the tank and the combat vehicle have huge modernization potential.  And in the coming decades this potential will be used.  And mass serial production has reduced the cost of this equipment in the extreme.  And long use in the troops has revealed practically all ‘minuses’ of these vehicles.”

“Modernization of the T-72 to the T-72B3 level costs a bit more than 50 million rubles.  In other words, for one ‘Armata’ we can have several T-72B3s right away.   Naturally, the T-90 would be more desirable, but it is cost prohibitive.”

“It’s exactly the same situation with the famous T-50 system.  The aircraft is ready. Moreover, it’s been put in series production.  And in the plans it’s supposed to be the main fighter.  This ‘hulk’ looks impressive in our plans.  In 2020 we should already have 60 fighters in the force.  And in the future their production should increase.”

“In reality we’ll get exactly the same as ‘Armata.’  We want to do a ‘split,’ but our britches get in the way…  It will be good if we have a regiment of such aircraft in 2020.”

“But we have the fully combat capable, even compared to the American F-22 and F-35, Su-30MK.  And, according to the assertions of its builders, the potential of these aircraft is far from used up.”

“And what’s the result?  As a result, we see the famous ‘half-full glass.’  Part of the readers are now sighing sadly.  The army is ‘penned up.’  Another part thinks that the Russian Army, in the shape which we have it, can really confront the enemy.  The third part giggles happily.  They have failed to modernize.  Oafs.  We told them…”

“It’s not for nothing that I called this article by a Stalinist name.  This isn’t a greatness mania or a wish to show off knowledge of the works of the ‘leader of peoples.’  We truly have become a little ‘dizzy.’  Not everything has succeeded right away.”

“I generally believe that the right way to move is walking or running.  But not ‘leapfrog’ jumps.  Movement should be measured and in one direction.  Therefore, the modernization of the army should continue.  Continue, no matter what.  But not by busting a gut.”

“I would be wary of talking about our weapons and combat equipment like junk.  Particularly after what this equipment showed in Syrian battles.  Just the same to talk also about the superiority of Western armies in some components.  But if we view the army like the world, a ‘gap’ will always be found.  But this gap is always ‘plugged’ by something else.”

“The dizziness quickly passes if you leave the centrifuge or wheel.  If, of course, you have a properly functioning outer office staff.  I think healthy people serve in our Ministry of Defense.”

“But just one moment.  No one needs to have the fact that our bureaucrats are not simply greedily stealing everything possible explained to them.  It’s a rare day when the Internet and television don’t report about the latest stuff that’s ‘flown off.'”

“It’s necessary to stop those who ‘have become dizzy with success.’  With the methods of the person I quoted.  Severe and long-term.  Take that Zakharchenko.  9 billion rubles — that’s a great deal.  The T-90, for example, today costs about 120 million rubles.  That is 75 tanks laid in the brute’s hidey-holes.  Two battalions.  Not bad…”

“And this is one of the deputies…”

[Colonel Dmitriy Zakharchenko is, or was, deputy chief of Directorate T in the MVD’s Main Directorate of Economic Security and Countering Corruption until his arrest in early September.  The foreign currency equivalent of 8 billion rubles was found in his apartment.  See RIA Novosti for an early report on his case.]

“And if they search his relatives, it’s certain it would be possible to scrape together a brigade easily and without effort.”

“‘Effective managers’ of our times have shown that they can only steal effectively.  From the budget just the same as from the GOZ.”

“It’s necessary to change the situation really at the root.  And tear this root with a crunch and snap on the image and likeness of ’37.  With the confiscation of everything that’s possible.”

“Only then will the state defense order be fulfilled on time and without problems.  And the president won’t have to shuffle, talking about how 70 percent is sufficient so we should relax.”

“So isn’t it?”

Year of Accomplishments

Krasnaya zvezda called this story “Year of Accomplishments,” but might have called it Day of Military Acceptance . . . .

President and Supreme CINC Vladimir Putin visited the NTsUO for the first time on 18 December.  He familiarized himself with the new national command center and its capabilities for accommodating and coordinating the work of the military and other high-level government organs.

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin Touring the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Putin’s seat is in the upper balcony opposite the big screens.

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

Another View of the NTsUO (photo: Mil.ru)

The first real order of business, however, was reviewing fulfillment of the State Defense Order in 2014.

Recall this year the political leadership and Defense Ministry launched a quarterly exercise of enumerating what was procured the previous three months on what they call the Day of Military Acceptance (День военной приёмки).

It’s almost as though the Kremlin is irritated someone has audaciously suggested that Russian output of new armaments and other military equipment hasn’t been especially impressive in years past.  

The Supreme CINC said:

“At recent meetings in Sochi we already noted that practically all Gosoboronzakaz tasks for this year have been fulfilled, and its general volume increased by almost half in comparison with 2013.”

Putin went on to say that 4,500 weapons, military, and special equipment were acquired in 2014, including:

  • 142 aircraft;
  • 135 helicopters;
  • 4 submarines;
  • 15 surface ships and boats / craft;
  • 19 SAM systems;
  • 590 tanks and BMPs;
  • 3 Yars ICBM regiments;
  • 7 modernized Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers.

It isn’t clear which four submarines the Russian president means.  Probably the third Borey-class (proyekt 955A) SSBN Vladimir Monomakh and Improved Kilo-class (proyekt 636.3) diesel-electric Novorossiysk.  But Borey unit 2 Aleksandr Nevskiy was accepted late last year.  And it would be a stretch to accept the next two Improved Kilos before January.

KZ then turns to Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and his words before an expanded MOD collegium in the NTsUO.

He said Russian strategic forces received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2014 — 16 ICBMs and 22 SLBMs — most of the latter placed on Borey unit 1 Yuriy Dolgorukiy.  He claimed that 56 percent of Russia’s strategic weapons are now “modern.”

Shoygu said Russia’s 14 UAV sub-units (companies or platoons) received 179 UAVs.

He expounded a bit on the Supreme CINC:

“The Ground Troops were supplied with two brigade sets of operational-tactical missile systems ‘Iskander-M,’ 294 modernized tanks, 296 other armored combat vehicles, two ‘S-300V4’ Ground Troops air defense systems, almost 5 thousand vehicles.”

“The Air Forces received 142 aircraft, of which 53 are multipurpose Su-30 and Su-35S aircraft systems, 16 Su-34, 28 transport and training aircraft of various types, 18 modernized fighter-interceptors MiG-31BM, 135 helicopters, including 46 combat and 72 transports.”

Mil.ru posted the videos and texts presented to Putin and the collegium.  They address all of the priority tasks of the military this year.  One, of course, is “Equipping with Modern Armaments and Military Equipment.”  It provides the following data (different from Putin and Shoygu):

  • 294 modernized T-72B3;
  • 7 S-400 SAM systems;
  • Yasen-class SSN Severodvinsk (accepted in 2013?!@#) ;
  • Novorossiysk;
  • 5 surface ships and 10 boats / craft of various classes.

This account mentions that the serviceability of weapons and equipment rose from 80 to 85 percent.

Accepting submarines at year’s end seems to enable Moscow to claim that they were accepted, or to count them as “produced,” in two years rather than just one.

All in all, more weapons and equipment were acquired in 2014 and 2013 than in 2012, 2011, etc.  But it’s a little like comparing something and nothing. Serious procurement on a fairly wide front didn’t begin until after 2012.

Defense Sector Wages

Interesting item on wages in Russia’s defense industrial sector in NG on November 11.

Alina Terekhova reports average monthly pay in the OPK is 17 percent higher than the country as a whole.  However, defense industry salaries lag employee earnings in other key sectors (i.e. railroads, oil, finance).  Yet they are likely to grow while wages elsewhere will probably begin to fall.

Minpromtorg [rather optimistically] forecasts that the earnings of OPK workers will double over the coming five years.

Defense industry pay grew 13 percent last year [not entirely consistent with the table below] against almost 12 percent in other areas.

Average Pay in the OPK

Average Pay in the OPK

Earlier this year, workers in Russia’s mining industry made nearly 57,000 rubles per month, oil workers 83,000, railroads 41,000, and finance 67,000.  Pay in the defense industries averaged about 38,000 rubles per month during the first half of 2014, according to Rosstat.  Nationwide it was about 32,000.

That 38,000 seems to fit in the context of other salaries (e.g. 30-35,000 for junior officers and contractees).

Rising inflation, Terekhova reports, could reduce real earnings for everyone next year.

She quotes a couple experts, neither of whom expects a decline in OPK wages. Despite the stagnation evident in the economy, the Kremlin will likely continue funding the GOZ generously given increased tensions with the West.  This will keep upward pressure on defense sector salaries.

It’s interesting that the oft-mentioned “cadre famine” in defense industry hasn’t bid wages higher.  But some enterprises report the average age (and presumably the pay grade) of their workers is dropping with the arrival of new and younger employees.

What’s Been Bought

It’s usually challenging to discover what the Russian military bought in any given year.  But it’s somewhat easier now that procurement is increasing.

Shoygu in the Videoconference (photo: Mil.ru)

Shoygu in the Videoconference (photo: Mil.ru)

On January 14, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu reviewed 2013 procurement in a year-opening videoconference.

He indicated that GOZ-2013 was fulfilled at 96 percent for RDT&E, 93 percent for armament and military equipment purchases, and 91 percent for repairs and servicing.  Purchases increased by 70 percent over 2012.

Beyond that no details.

If Shoygu’s scant and statistical, Topwar.ru’s Kirill Ryabov rescues us.

Ryabov says GOZ-2013 amounted to 1.45 trillion rubles, two-thirds more than 2012.  Roughly the same accounting as Shoygu’s 70 percent.  But Ryabov’s also tracked what was bought.  He doesn’t give full citations for his data.  But it’s a working list.

He starts with air defense:

  • 6 S-400 SAM battalions.
  • 6 Pantsir-S1 missile-gun systems (ZRPKs).
  • 24 Tor-M1-2U SAMs (SA-15 upgrade).
  • 12 Tunguska ZRPKs.

More than 300 combat and support vehicles for the Ground Troops, including:

  • 2 Iskander-M SSM brigades (107th in the Eastern and 1st in the Southern MD).
  • 54 BTR-82A APCs.
  • 12 BMO-T flamethrowers.
  • 90 Tornado and Grad MLRS.
  • 20 Khosta SP guns.
  • 40 Msta-S SP howitzers.
  • 16 Zoopark counterbattery radars.
  • 16 Leyer-2 EW systems.
  • 10 Redut-2US communications systems.

And reportedly more than 5,200 other vehicles and automobiles.

It gets murkier from here on . . . .

For the Air Forces, Ryabov indicates OAK, in 2013, got orders for 60 military aircraft for 62 billion rubles.  Only 35 were reportedly ordered in 2012.

  • 2008 contract for 36 [sic?] Su-34 fighter-bombers was completed in 2013, and Sukhoy started filling the 2012 contract for 92 more.
  • 12 Su-35S were delivered ahead of schedule.
  • 8 Su-30SM, 12 Yak-130 trainers, and an An-140-100 transport were delivered or will be soon (?).

For helicopters:

  • 19 Ka-52 / Alligator.
  • 8 Mi-28N / Night Hunter.
  • 3 Mi-35M.
  • 3 Mi-26.
  • 5 Mi-8AMTSh.
  • 7 Mi-8 (jamming variants).

For the Navy, 12 large and 43 small ships were reportedly launched.  Thirty-five ships and craft of various types were commissioned into the fleet.

Anything more specific requires additional investigation. 

Two Borey-class SSBNs (which can’t perform their primary mission) were accepted for service.  Steregushchiy-class (proyekt 20380) FFL Boykiy joined the Baltic Fleet.

Steregushchiy-class FFL Boykiy (photo: Topwar.ru)

Steregushchiy-class FFL Boykiy (photo: Topwar.ru)

As if on cue, Deputy Defense Minister (armaments chief) Yuriy Borisov held a press-conference on January 16 to discuss last year’s GOZ.

According to him, the Su-35S has not been accepted, but it’s about to be.  Initial deliveries aren’t far behind.  More than 2,200 armored vehicles and other transport means were purchased, and 1,700 modernized.  He said the share of modern armor has reached 24 percent.

The year just past definitely continued the trend of more military procurement from 2012.  But is it enough to get the volume of weapons systems Russia’s military and political leadership wants before 2020?

Remember what procurement lists floated in 2010 looked like:

  • 56 S-400 “units.”
  • 10 S-500 systems.
  • 600 aircraft.
  • 1,000 helicopters.
  • Bulava SLBMs.
  • 20 submarines.
  • 15 frigates.
  • 35 corvettes like Boykiy.
  • Mistral-class amphibious ships.
  • Several new ICBMs.

Even relatively healthy acquisition like GOZ-2013 won’t get to these numbers.