Tag Archives: Maintenance

New Industrial-Logistical Complex

Moscow region’s Telekanal 360 station recently reported on Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu’s tour of the Russian military’s first “industrial-logistic complex.”

The first PLK [ПЛК] is located in Naro-Fominsk, not far from Moscow. The 450-acre facility reportedly will store 120 thousand tons of spare parts, to include vehicle engines, transmissions, treads, and tires, as well as other supplies.

The MOD is planning for throughput of 230 thousand tons of freight annually. The PLK will have a centralized dispatch service to provide more streamlined ordering for troop units.

Its first section — two 20,000-square-meter warehouses — was built in seven months. The second section is due for completion in September.  The MOD plans to construct more than 20 PLKs throughout the RF.

The first report on the military’s effort to build “industrial-logistic complexes” appeared in 2014. The initial complex was touted as being a public-private partnership including some commercial space. It was supposed to be finished before the end of 2015.

Announcing the effort, MOD rear services chief Army General Dmitriy Bulgakov said 24 new complexes would be erected before the end of 2018 to replace 400 obsolete military depots and warehouses. He also indicated that construction of one in Armavir (Krasnodar territory) had begun, and work on another in Khabarovsk was to start imminently.

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Serviceability

On August 1, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu conducted a teleconference during which he addressed the serviceability (исправность) of Russia’s weapons and military equipment.

Defense Minister Shoygu

Defense Minister Shoygu

Serviceability is pretty synonymous with “in service,” “good condition,” “operability,” or “equipment operational readiness.”

Shoygu reported that the Russian military has achieved the following serviceability rates:

  • 63 percent for Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft;
  • 96 percent for air and missile defense systems;
  • 98 percent for space systems;
  • 76 percent for the Navy;
  • 94 percent for armored units;
  • 93 percent for artillery units.

Shoygu claimed that the military has devoted attention to obtaining higher quality weapons systems and to supporting their serviceability in the future.  He attributed high equipment availability to the shift to “full life cycle” maintenance contracts.  He said the MOD has worked with producers and developers to find problems that occur during use and work out measures to prevent them in the future.

In 2014, Shoygu reported that the overall serviceability of Russian arms and equipment improved from 80 to 85 percent.

In late 2013, Kommersant reported that the serviceability rate of aircraft in the air forces (VVS) was below 50 percent.  “Permanent readiness” requires 80 percent operational availability.

The MOD Action Plan (2013) specifies that equipment in-service rates for the ground troops and navy should be 85 percent and 80 percent for aircraft by 2020.

The U.S. military goal is 90 percent for all equipment except aircraft, which is 75 percent. But actual serviceability varies widely depending on a unit’s training and operational tempo.  Recovery time might actually be more critical.

The Canadian Army recently assessed its major vehicle and equipment fleet serviceability at 60 percent, which apparently didn’t make it too happy.

What do we make of Shoygu’s claims about the Russian military’s serviceability rates?

The Russians have put more effort against equipment modernization, overhauls, and repairs since Shoygu came to the MOD.  Therefore, increasing rates of serviceability aren’t surprising.

At the same time, the serviceability rate can be manipulated easily.

In most militaries, serviceability is determined and reported up the chain by military units themselves.  In the U.S., equipment readiness/serviceability is an element of the Unit Status Report (USR). It’s possible for commanders to fudge it.  The question is are they inclined to do this?

In Russia — where fulfilling the plan and meeting norms is highly valued, it seems likely.  Add to this the recent command housecleaning in the Baltic Fleet.  The MOD did a clean sweep on its headquarters for, among other things, padding numbers on training, readiness, etc.  So perhaps Shoygu double-checks his subordinates’ claims.

This is the country that created the Potemkin village.  For centuries, Russian provincials have been trying to fool any inspector-general (or party bureaucrat) sent from St. Petersburg (or Moscow).

At the same time, fudging can also be initiated at the top.  Mentioned on these pages more than once is the old trick of slashing the denominator to raise your percentage.  If 7,000 of 10,000 tanks are running, write 2,000 off and suddenly 88 percent of the army’s assets are serviceable, right?

In the end, we may have suspicions about Shoygu’s serviceability claims, but we don’t have any independent insight.  It’s true, though, that any military establishment that fools itself (at whatever level) about its “equipment operational readiness” runs an awful risk the next time bullets are fired in anger.

Air Forces Half Out-of-Order

"OAK-Service" Initial Corporate Structure (photo: Kommersant)

“OAK-Servis” Initial Corporate Structure (photo: Kommersant)

Kommersant’s Ivan Safronov and Yelena Kiseleva wrote Monday (28 October) on the status of devolving Oboronservis’ Aviaremont into a subsidiary of the United Aircraft Corporation (OAK).  In the process, they indicated less than half of Russia’s combat airplanes are serviceable.

Aviaremont enterprises will become OAK-Servis subholdings.  The factories will repair aircraft for the Defense Ministry, and for other power ministries and agencies.  OAK and the MOD already have an 84-billion-ruble contract for repairs in place.  Meanwhile, Aviaremont owes the MOD 115 billion, which OAK has promised to make good.

OAK-Servis is supposed to provide life-cycle support for MOD (mainly VVS) airplanes.  And it will “correct an unfavorable situation in the condition of the current inventory of the Air Forces, which still aren’t guaranteeing the necessary level of technical combat readiness,” Kommersant writes.

OAK-Servis will establish service centers and 24-7 mobile repair teams, then, in 2015-2018, modernize capital equipment in its repair plants.  It will also grapple with a problem it can’t solve in the short-term, “the cessation of industrial output of components and systems used in the repair of old aircraft models and the rising price of spares and parts.”

But OAK believes it can ensure a profit for plants that once belonged to Aviaremont.  Ruslan Pukhov tells Kommersant less money in the next GPV means less procurement and more repairs and modernization after 2020.

Now for the interesting part . . .

In a sidebar, the authors describe the parlous state of technical readiness in the Air Forces.

All VVS units are supposed to be in “permanent readiness,” with not less than 80 percent of the airplanes in their established composition in a serviceable state.

But Safronov and Kiseleva report only 42 percent of VVS airplanes overall, and 49 percent of its combat airplanes, are serviceable.

The most serious situation with fitness for flying is found in Tu-160 and Tu-22 [Tu-22M3] bombers, the MiG-29 and MiG-25, An-22 transports, L-39 trainers, and others for which serviceability hovers around 20-25 percent.

In 2013, the VVS had 696 airplanes in need of repair, but as (or if) new ones reach the inventory toward 2020, the number in need of repair will reportedly decline to just 49.

The sidebar says, along with repairing MVD, FSB, and MChS platforms, OAK repair plants will also have to maintain and overhaul exported airplanes.

Recall for a moment the MOD’s Action Plan to 2020 . . . the section on equipping the armed forces indicated year-end VVS aircraft serviceability rates will be 55 percent in 2013, 75 percent in 2014, and 80 percent in 2015.

These numbers require pretty fast improvement.