Tag Archives: Topol

Longer Combat Duty

Yars in the Field

Seems like standard stuff but there might be something here.  It could be the U.S.-Russian deadlock over missile defense.  It might (somewhat ironically) be the increasing age of Russia’s mobile ICBMs.  There are probably additional or alternative explanations.

Krasnaya zvezda and Mil.ru have dedicated print recently to Russian mobile ICBMs spending more time on their combat patrol routes.

On January 18, KZ wrote that Topol, Topol-M, and Yars units from central Russia and Siberia are in the midst of exercises to implement the highest states of combat readiness and to carry out combat duty on combat patrol routes (in field positions).  Troops are conducting a number of training tasks — system calibration, engineering preparation of field positions, CCD (maskirovka), and combat security.  They also have to react to training “injects” from higher commands.

The Defense Ministry’s daily said units would be deployed to field positions for a longer period, from January 16 to February 3.  It indicated all divisions and units will also institute a new type of training this winter — a “complex practical exercise” in implementing combat readiness.

RIA Novosti’s account indicated this annual training is routine, just with more time spent in the field.

In a December 28 review of the year in RVSN, KZ reported turgidly:

“90 percent of field training measures were conducted with missile launcher regiments and battalions departing for combat patrol routes.  In the summer training period, a test of the order of conducting combat duty in the highest combat readiness states with an increased duration of mobile ground missile regiments on combat patrol routes was conducted.  This allowed for ensuring the readiness of missile launcher regiments for maneuvering actions.  All missile regiments were evaluated positively in the results of the tactical exercises.”

In mid-November, Mil.ru summarized RVSN Commander General-Lieutenant Karakayev’s comments:

“Division, unit, and sub-unit combat training was maintained at a level ensuring their capability to conduct military actions under various conditions of the situation.  A test of the order of conducting combat duty in the highest states of combat readiness with an increased duration of mobile missile regiments on combat patrol routes was conducted.”

“The training of multi-axle chassis mechanic-drivers ensured accident-free operation of nuclear weapons.  Despite the fact that currently more than 70% of missile systems are beyond the limit of their warranty periods, the technical condition, the reliability characteristics of the armaments and military equipment guaranteed maintenance of the required level of combat readiness of missile systems.”

You can find additional relevant info on RVSN combat duty and patrols here.

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Extending the SS-25

SS-25 / Topol (photo: RIA Novosti / Sergey Guneyev)

Strat forces aren’t this author’s favorite or best subject.  Unlike some other Russian military issues, there are many places to turn for info on ICBMs, SLBMs, ALCMs, and their launchers.  Yet one still can’t resist a whack at yesterday’s story.

RVSN Commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Karakayev told the RVSN Veterans’ Union that Russia intends to, once again, extend the service life of its single-warhead mobile SS-25 / Topol ICBM force:

“Ongoing work to extend the service life of the Topol missile system to 25 years allows for keeping missile regiments with mobile launchers of this type on combat duty until 2019, until the start of their rearming with the new Yars mobile missile system.”

So, SS-25 regiments will gradually be rearmed with the MIRVed RS-24 / Yars.  Media outlets noted Russia is currently rearming its second RS-24 regiment, and its sixth silo-based SS-27 / Topol-M regiment.

This isn’t the first, and probably won’t be the last, service life extension for the SS-25, which had an original warranty of ten years.  Its life was extended to 20 years with a test in 2005, to 21 years in 2007, and 23 years, or until 2015 according to an RVSN spokesman, with a firing last October 28.

What caught one’s eye was Russianforces.org’s attention to the fact that the Russians say they’ll extend the service life by two more years (25), but the missiles will stay in the force four more years (2019).  Russianforces concludes Moscow must’ve been making SS-25s as late as 1994 rather than 1992.

In any event, it’s a cheap way to keep deployed ICBM numbers up, as long as the SS-25 performs.  A 25-year SS-25 lets them stretch RS-24 and SS-27 deployment timelines, find SS-18 and SS-19 replacements, and produce Bulava SLBMs at a time when there are many other demands on the defense budget.

Maybe it gets the RVSN to 2014 or 2015 before they have to deploy the RS-24 more quickly to replace retired SS-25s.  If they further extend the SS-25’s life, maybe they get close to 2018 or 2019 before the RS-24 deployments really pick up.

At any rate, it was notable that Karakayev put his stamp on the SS-25’s life extension.

I’m Good Until 2026

Happy 51st RVSN Day . . . Commander General-Lieutenant Sergey Karakayev indicated that service life extension can keep Voyevoda, Stiletto, and Topol in the strategic missile inventory until 2026.  The RVSN is working on ICBM modernization, and has RDT&E in the GPV to deal with new challenges and threats to its missile force.

According to ITAR-TASS, Karakayev said:

“Nevertheless, the service life of the RS-18 ICBM (U.S. and NATO classification Stiletto) has already reached 33 years.  For the RS-20V missile (Voyevoda) and RS-12M (Topol), this term is 23 and 24 years respectively.  And the initial warranty period was defined as 10-15 years.  Practice has shown that the service life of the systems considerably exceeds the established warranty term of use.  It is quite difficult now to determine definitely what kind of safety margin there is.  A series of experimental-design work is being conducted with this goal.”

“The economic expedience of such work is obvious.  For example, extending the service life of the RS-20V (Voyevoda) missile system will allow us to keep the world’s most powerful missiles in the RVSN force until 2026.  Such possibilities also exist for RS-18 and RS-12M missiles.”

“Replacing them with new missiles would require financial outlays far exceeding expenditures on this work.  At present, there are no unresolved technical problems to the further extension of the service lives of the missile systems.”

“Together with the general designers from a whole row of domestic industrial enterprises and organizations, the missile troops are conducting work not only to support the condition and the improvement of existing missile armament, but also their significant modernization, with a constant goal:  under any conditions, to provide a guaranteed resolution of the missions of nuclear deterrence.  Everything is subordinate to this, including measures to modernize the combat equipment of missile systems, which are fully adequate for both the emerging and forecasted military-strategic environment.”

“The scientific-technical and design pool of domestic military missile building will allow us to react flexibly to rising challenges and threats to Russia’s security.  The RDT&E laid out in the State Program of Armaments for 2011-2020 is directed at this.”

Strategic Forces Training

Russia fired two SLBMs and an ICBM today.  Pacific Fleet Delta III SSBN Saint Georgiy Pobedonosets launched an SS-N-18 (RSM-50) SLBM from the Sea of Okhotsk.  Northern Fleet Delta IV SSBN Bryansk fired a Sineva (RSM-54) SLBM from the Barents Sea. 

And a crew from the Vladimir Missile Army’s Bologoye Division launched an SS-25 (RS-12M/Topol) ICBM from Plesetsk.

An RVSN spokesman said this launch allows Russia to extend the service life of this grouping of SS-25s to 23 years or until about 2015, and to conduct a planned replacement of these missiles without overburdening the military’s budget.

Yesterday Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers launched weapons on ranges in Irkutsk and Komi as part of an Air Forces exercise.

According to some reports, the Navy may test fire the Bulava SLBM for the second time in 2010 tomorrow.

Routine Change of Command or Not?

Kommersant published some extra details on Sergey Karakayev’s career.  He has served in all RVSN command and staff duties.  He began in the 320th Missile Regiment, 7 th Missile Division (Bologoye-4, Tver Oblast) as a group engineer, training and launch group commander, and finally chief of staff.  In 1994, he became a regiment commander, then chief of staff in the 28th Missile Division (Kozelsk-5, Kaluga Oblast).  He commanded this division from 1998-2001.  Then he headed the Second Department, First Directorate, Main Personnel Directorate.  During 2006-2008, he commanded 27 th (Vladimir) Missile Army.  On October 22, 2009, Karakayev became First Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the RVSN.

A source told Kommersant Karakayev’s appointment was ‘expected,’ adding that Andrey Shvaychenko requested retirement on 9 June and left on leave.  The source claimed he’d reached the service age limit of 55 for two-star generals, but this isn’t correct.  Shvaychenko actually turned 57 on 18 June.  Kommersant’s interlocutor went on to say that Shvaychenko himself recommended Karakayev to  succeed him.

Academy of Military Sciences strategic arms expert Yuriy Rubtsov told Svobodnaya pressa the change at the top of the RVSN may be related to difficulties in, and disagreements over, modernizing the Russian ICBM force under the new strategic arms agreement. 

According to Rubtsov, the RVSN will have to trim its ICBMs by a third under the new arms treaty.  But new missiles are arriving in the force in only miserly portions, and don’t replace what has to be scrapped.  No matter how much the service lives of ICBMs on combat duty since Soviet times have been extended, they still have to be cut, ultimately in 2015.

Svpressa cites NATO estimates that at most 7 Topols are reaching the RVSN each year.  At such a tempo, it’s essential to keep old weapons a little longer.  A sufficient number of Topol-M missile units have not been created, so the SS-18 and SS-19 still underpin Russia’s delivery of unacceptable damage on the enemy.  But Russia continues unilateral disarmament.  According to Svpressa, in such a situation, the more often you change RVSN Commanders, the easier it is to control them and not allow opposition to your strategic nuclear policy. 

Svpressa speculates maybe replacing Shvaychenko was President Medvedev’s way of flexing his muscles before the U.S. visit, grabbing some attention, and signaling Obama that Russia is disarming as agreed and everything is OK.